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Introduction

As sensor technology becomes increasingly easy to integrate into personal devices such as mobile phones, clothing, and athletic equipment, there will be new applications
involving opportunistic, people-centric sensing. These applications, which gather information about human activities
and personal social context, raise many security and privacy challenges. In particular, data integrity is important for
many applications, whether using traffic data for city planning or medical data for diagnosis. Although our AnonySense system (to be presented at MobiSys [1]) addresses
privacy in people-centric sensing, protecting data integrity
in people-centric sensing still remains a challenge. Some
mechanisms to protect privacy provide anonymity, and thus
provide limited means for accountability; data integrity becomes even more difficult to protect.
We propose SenseRight, the first architecture for highintegrity people-centric sensing. The SenseRight approach,
which extends and enhances AnonySense, assures integrity
of both the sensor data (through use of tamper-resistant
sensor devices) and the sensor context (through a timeconstrained protocol), maintaining anonymity if desired.
Our poster will include protocol details and experimental
results from our prototype implementation.
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SenseRight

SenseRight leverages unmodified, untrusted mobile devices (such as smart phones or PDAs) carried by people
who are willing to contribute sensor data (from body-area
sensors) for application use. Our goal is to protect data integrity, in that the system accepts a report only if its sensor
values are delivered intact from legitimate sensors (sensorreading integrity), its sensor values are collected at a similar
time (context consistency), and its values are collected under the desired condition (condition integrity). SenseRight
also protects sensor values from eavesdroppers (confidentiality).
The SenseRight architecture is shown in the figure. The
system abstracts central services that provide a task-based
sensing model with the following operations: (1) an application (App) submits tasks to the system, (2) the system dispatches tasks to mobile nodes (MN), (3) the MN
collects sensor readings (per the task’s instructions) from
sensor nodes (SN), and (4) the MN submits reports to the
App through the system. The CN is a certifier node that
safeguards data integrity through the SenseRight collection
protocol, summarized below.
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Protocol sketch

Overview. We imagine that the SN and CN are
small, wearable mass-produced devices that have shortrange wireless communications and limited computation
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capability, plus tamper-resistant hardware that makes it difficult for attackers to access their secret keys or to modify
their firmware. A secure initialization protocol establishes a
secure channel among the MN, CN, and SNs, and a secure
collection protocol allows the CN to collect signed sensor
readings from the SNs. The CN can prove the correctness
of the reports through a cryptographic signature that only
trusted CNs can generate. This three-component approach
provides the desired security, privacy, and integrity properties and enables the use of off-the-shelf mobile devices with
simple (cheap) sensor nodes.
Bootstrapping. The system certifies only valid, tamperresistent CN and SN devices. The system provides each SN
with a certificate that certifies the SN’s public key and its list
of sensors. The system provides each CN with a certificate
that certifies the CN’s public key for digital signature and/or
group signature (for anonymous sensing).
Initialization. Prior to performing sensing tasks, the
MN must have run the one-time initialization protocol.
First, the MN uses SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) to authenticate the CN and establish an encrypted channel. Then, the
CN uses TinySSL to authenticate each SN and establish an
encrypted channel. Finally, the CN generates a fresh encryption key for each SN and securely distributes it to the
SN and the MN.
Sensing. As specified by the task, the MN periodically
requests readings from the SNs and tests a task-specific condition. When the condition is met, the MN asks the CN to
collect sensor data within a task-specified deadline time ∆.
The CN then collects and verifies sensor data from the SNs,
then prepares a signed message containing the collected values, elapsed time, and task id.
Reporting. The MN, receiving signed data from the CN,
reports to the system whenever an Internet connection becomes available. For each report, the system verifies that
(1) the signature matches the message and uses a systemcertified signature key, (2) the report includes all required
sensor values, (3) the values meets the sensing condition,
and (4) the elapsed time is short (less than ∆).
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